

# 1. 1964년 2월 29일 주미일본대사와 미국 국무부장관 대화록

Japan, Memos Vol. 1, 11/63 - 4/64  
250

White House 1461

EE:EA:PAFearey/pmh  
(Drafting Office and Officer)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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3454

Approved in S 3/8/64

## Memorandum of Conversation

SANITIZED

DATE: February 29, 1964

SUBJECT: Japan-Korea Normalization Agreement

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE  
Country File  
Japan, vol. 1, Memos  
Box 250

PARTICIPANTS: Ryuji TAKEUCHI, Ambassador of Japan  
Masao KANAZAWA, Political Counselor

The Secretary  
Robert W. Barnett, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs  
Robert A. Fearey, Acting Deputy Director for East Asian Affairs

### COPIES TO:

S/S	E-2	AmEmbassy TOKYO
G	U/PW-2	" SEOUL
S/P	L-2	" TATPET
FE-3	INR	
FE/P-2	CIA	
FE/EA-3	White House	

The Secretary said that he had invited Ambassador Takeuchi in to express again our very great interest in a Japan-Korea normalization agreement. He had left his conversations with Prime Minister Ikeda and President Pak with the strong impression that both really wanted agreement and believed that recent developments were conducive to finalization of an agreement in time to permit ratification during the present Diet session. Both capitals might think we were pressing hard but the advantages of a settlement for all of us are so great that as agreement appeared in sight "one could almost taste it". The Secretary said that he would appreciate the Ambassador's passing on to Foreign Minister Ohira the importance we attach to conclusion of the agreement this spring if at all possible. Noting that he had made the same points to Ambassador Kim, the Secretary asked if Ambassador Takeuchi had any late information on the progress of the negotiations.

1.3  
(a)(3)

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;  
not automatically declassified

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NUJ

91-12

By 147 NARA, Date 5-29-91

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MAR 20 1964

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
노컷뉴스

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The Secretary asked whether it might be feasible to schedule both technical and political discussions in relation to each other, so each side could enter into the kind of discussions it wants.



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-3-

Mr. Barnett said that it was our understanding from recent reports that all relevant fisheries considerations are now on the table, with little or no further "research" necessary. Technicians tend to become obsessed with technical aspects. The will to agree seems strong on both sides and the gap relatively manageable if dealt with concurrently at the technical and political levels as the Secretary had suggested.

1.3  
(u)(3)

The Secretary said that it had been his experience that when experts differed, the solution sometimes was for ministers to tell them to resume their discussions and come up with a solution. This was well illustrated by the experience of technicians and ministers in the GATT negotiations.

1.3  
(u)(3)

The Secretary asked whether it might be useful to set a date now for a meeting at the Foreign Ministers level and to establish a preparatory committee to prepare for that meeting.

1.3  
(u)(3)

The Secretary expressed appreciation for the information Ambassador Takeuchi had provided and asked him to convey to Foreign Minister Ohira the U.S. Government's hopes for an early Japan-ROK settlement.

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3. 1965년 3월 16일 체스터 쿠퍼(NSC)가 마빈 왓슨(NSC고문) 및 맥조지 번디(국가안보특보)에게 보낸 보고서

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

March 16, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MARVIN WATSON

THROUGH McGEORGE BUNDY *mpk*

SUBJECT: Call on the President by the Korean  
Foreign Minister Tong Won LEE,  
March 17, 1965, 11:30 a.m.

The President has agreed to receive Korean Foreign  
Minister Tong Won LEE for 10 to 15 minutes on March 17 at 11:30.

Foreign Minister Lee is in Washington to discuss the Korea-  
Japan negotiations and the May 17-18 State Visit of Korean President  
Chung Hee PARK.

Foreign Minister Lee will be accompanied by Korean  
Ambassador Hyun Chul KIM, Assistant Secretary William P. Bundy,  
Ambassador to Korea Winthrop G. Brown, and Ambassador Lloyd  
N. Hand.

Thirty-eight years of age, Lee was appointed Foreign  
Minister in July of 1964. He has studied in the United States and in  
England and is the first Korean to receive a Ph. D. in Political  
Science from Oxford University. He was formerly Chief Presidential  
Secretary to President Park (1962-63). Lee has played a key role in  
the negotiations for a settlement with Japan.

We expect Foreign Minister Lee to:

1) Express his Government's determination to reach a  
settlement with Japan, hopefully before President Park's State Visit,  
and to seek assurance that a settlement with Japan would not  
adversely affect the U. S. policy of assistance to Korea. (As part of  
such a settlement, Japan will pay \$600 million in reparations to  
Korea.)

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 90-221

By *JP* NARA, Date *4-3-91*

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 92-151  
By fw, NARA, Date 8-7-92

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 13 1965

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Development Loan Commitment to Korea

Recommendation:

That you authorize announcement of the Development Loan commitment in the Joint Communiqué as outlined below.

Approve ✓ Disapprove       

Discussion:

Work is well advanced on the Communiqué for President Park's visit with you May 17-19. Both we and the Koreans hope that the visit will contribute significantly to the effort President Park must make on his return to secure public acceptance and legislative ratification for the Korea-Japan settlement. The settlement continues to meet strong opposition in Korea, where the Opposition parties charge that the U.S. favors a settlement primarily in order to shift its economic and security burdens in Korea to Japan.

Your authorization is requested to include in the Communiqué the statement that the U.S. Government plans, subject to applicable legislation and appropriations, to make available to the Republic of Korea over the next few years \$150 million in Development Loan funds for projects and programs agreed to by the U.S. Government under the terms of AID legislation and policies. It would also be announced that after the use of these funds, we anticipate making further development loan monies available. This commitment would form part of a public statement of our intention to continue various forms of assistance

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Korea, Box 256  
Park Visit Briefing  
Book, 5/17-19/65

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
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- 2 -

to Korea, of which only the Development Loan portion would be quantified.

The \$150 million in Development Loans and the other planned assistance is no more than we plan to provide in any event over the next three fiscal years, but its announcement at this time may be crucial to the Korea-Japan settlement.

This request has the concurrence of AID Administrator Bell.

  
Acting Secretary

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Friday, May 14, 1965  
5:25 PM

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-148

By 48, NARA, Date 6-22-93

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Development Loan Commitment to Korea

The attached paper from State requests your approval for the inclusion of a specific \$150-million Development Loan commitment, over the next few years, in your joint communique with President Park next Tuesday.

This item will be one part of a generalized assistance package designed to reassure the Koreans of our continued support despite the imminent conclusion of a Japan-Korea settlement. The sum in question is no more than we would normally plan to provide over the next three years. Furthermore, the communique will of course stipulate that the provision of such funds will be "subject to applicable legislation and appropriations."

Although it is unusual to cite a specific figure in connection with such a visit, both Embassy Seoul and the various Washington agencies are strongly convinced that Park has urgent need of such a quantified commitment in order to cope successfully with the acute fears of his opponents and of large sections of the Korean people that we are on the verge of abandoning their country to Japanese control.

In these circumstances, it would seem appropriate to make this exception to our general custom of avoiding such figures in a State Visit communique.

James C. Thomson, Jr.

McGeorge Bundy

Korea, Box 256  
Park Visit Briefing  
Book, 5/17-19/65  
3

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TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

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*Also ask Hanning  
McGeorge Bundy if  
all if they can't  
make some imaginative  
substantive contribution  
for the communique*



Mr. Cooper

PSG CH, KOREA  
"Park's visit briefing Book"  
Box 256

~~SECRET~~

May 17, 1965  
4:00 PM

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-21

By g, NARA, Date 4-23-91

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting at 5 p.m. today with President Park

President Chung Hee Park has come to Washington for one paramount reason: he seeks the strongest possible indication from us, both through our courtesies to him and through tangible evidence of continuing U.S. assistance, that we have no intention of abandoning Korea to Japanese control in the wake of a Japan-Korea settlement. Whatever reassurance we can give him will ease the severe problems he faces in gaining the support of his people for the ratification and acceptance of such a settlement.

Personal Factors: Park is a shy, intelligent man born of a farm family, he has spent most of his life in his nation's armed forces. He is said to be self-conscious of his height and therefore initially rather formal and stiff; he can respond to informality, however, once he feels at ease. His one form of recreation is horseback riding.

As you know, you met Park when he came to this country in November 1961 shortly after seizing power by a military coup; you met him again when he came to President Kennedy's funeral.

In the attached memorandum (which you have already seen) State has suggested certain topics that might arise in your talks. Here is a brief review of the major points:

1. Japan-Korea Settlement: Both parties have made great progress, and a basic treaty has been initialed; it should be signed within a few weeks, and ratification will probably come in July. We are deeply gratified with this progress, and Park's determination has been the chief ingredient. A settlement should bring a new and mutually productive relationship between two complementary economies and two natural allies.

2. Assistance to Vietnam: The Koreans now have 2,200 troops in Vietnam (including a military hospital unit, 10 karate instructors,

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- 2 -

an engineer battalion, a LST, and an infantry battalion to provide security for these forces). We are deeply grateful for this assistance -- given despite strong opposition from Park's political opponents. The GVN has now asked for further Korean troops. It is our judgement that a decision on such additional forces should be delayed until Park overcomes the acute problems he currently faces in pushing through a Japan-Korea settlement. (For your information: the Koreans had hoped to use the question of further troops in order to pry major additional concessions out of the U.S. Government during the Park visit; for this reason we should avoid specific discussions at this moment.)

3. U.S. Aid to Korea: Park will want all the reassurance we can give him on our continued economic support. We propose to include in the communique a general aid pledge: to finance Korea's essential imports, to make available \$150 million in development loan funds over the next few years, to continue technical assistance and training, and to keep up our Food for Peace aid. (Walt Rostow returned from Korea deeply impressed with their economic progress.)

4. U.S. and Korean Force Levels in Korea: The Koreans have wanted a very specific commitment from us to maintain our forces in Korea at their present level. They also seek our commitment to maintain sufficient assistance to keep their 600,000 troops at the present level. All we can say in response is that our commitment to their defense is absolute under the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, and that we would certainly consult with them on any changes in force levels which might be dictated by our regional and global requirements.

5. MAP Transfer Problem: The Koreans have been disturbed by our "MAP transfer" program since 1960 -- an effort to transfer the procurement there from the MAP to the Korean budget on materials that are obtainable on a commercial basis in Korea. Although we have delayed and softened certain aspects of this program, we cannot meet the Korean request in toto but are willing to indicate in the communique that certain adjustments have been made in order to ease the impact on the Korean economy.

Other Items:

Park will urge that we move towards a speedy conclusion of a Status of Forces Agreement. We are very close to such an agreement.

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# 7. 1965년 5월 17일 박정희-존슨 정상회담 대화록

5-17-1965  
 Approved by White House  
 5/28/65

~~SECRET~~

Copy for: The White House  
 1- Johnson  
 2- Ret. 6/15  
 8285

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

### Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: May 17, 1965  
 5:00 p.m.  
 The White House

SUBJECT: U.S.-Korean Relations

PARTICIPANTS: President Johnson  
 President Chung Hee Park of Korea  
 Mr. Sang Ho Cho, President Park's interpreter  
 Dr. Paul Crane, President Johnson's interpreter

COPIES TO:	FE/VN	AmEmbassy TOKYO	S/P
	INR	" SAIGON	
White House ✓	G/PM	CINCPAC	
S/S	AID/FE	CINCPAC for POLAD	
FE	OSD/ISA	G	
EA	AmEmbassy SEOUL	INR/OD	

President Johnson said that the U.S. planned to extend all possible aid to Korea. It planned to keep its troops there, and no reduction of troop strength was contemplated. However, if there were an adjustment, President Park would be the first to know about it, and full consultation would be held beforehand.

President Johnson congratulated Park on the happy progress of the Korea-Japan negotiations and said that he considered President Park to be the chief ingredient in the success of these negotiations. He felt that it was due to Park's leadership that things had been going so well. He realized that it had been a very tough and touchy problem. He felt that conclusion of the Korea-Japan treaty would also assist our mutual effort in Viet-Nam. President Park said he felt that the Korea-Japan negotiations could be concluded within a month, by early or middle June. He said that there were certain irresponsible people who were trying to block the negotiations, but he felt his public relations and other efforts would ensure conclusion of the agreement.

President Johnson congratulated President Park on his assistance in the struggle in Viet-Nam, and said, with reference to that aid that we would keep in Korea a military strength equivalent to that at present so that, in accordance with our commitments under the 1954 treaty, Korean security would not suffer.

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E.O. 12812, Sec. 3.4

NO. 87-93

DATE 8-29-89

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GPO 865971

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

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INFO RUALOS/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 446

USIA

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC 733

NSC

STATE GRNC

CPR

BT

RSR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ JUNE 24

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY HASHIMOTO JUST PHONED TO TELL ME THAT PRIME MINISTER SATO THROUGH AMBASSADOR TAKEUCHI HAD SENT TELEGRAM OF APPRECIATION TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON FOR LATTER'S MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS ON JAPAN-ROK AGREEMENT BUT WISHED TO SEND THROUGH ME TO THE PRESIDENT THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL OFF-THE-RECORD MESSAGE:

QUOTE I WISH TO EXPRESS TO YOU MR. PRESIDENT AND THROUGH YOU TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE OUR APPRECIATION FOR THE MORAL SUPPORT YOU HAVE GIVEN US IN THE COURSE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS UNQUOTE. REISCHAUER

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1965 JUN 24 AM 5 26

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Authority STATE 10-16-75

By LW, NARS, Date 11-12-85

Japan, 250

cables, vol. 2, (2.62)

9164 - 10/65

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Department of State Policy Paper

on

The Future of Japan

The statement of "Policy Tasks" contained in pages 78-91 of this paper is approved as Department of State policy toward the future of Japan. The paper was prepared as a Basic National Security Policy Task by the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs of the Department of State. It incorporates comments and revisions by the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo and was concurred in by the Embassy. It was discussed in the Secretary of State's Policy Planning Meeting and in the interdepartmental Planning Group. Suggestions by other Washington departments and agencies have been reflected in it, but it has not been formally coordinated and cleared by other agencies.

The following additional specific follow-up actions are being taken as a result of consideration of this paper:

- a. State and Defense will conduct a joint study to define more precisely the appropriate missions of the Japanese armed forces which the U.S. should seek.
- b. State will explore with the Japanese the possibility of creating closer relationships between the foreign policy planners in the U.S. and Japanese Governments through an arrangement broadly comparable to NATO's Atlantic Policy Advisory Group.

With the approval of this paper the BNSP Task on "The Future of Japan" is considered to be completed.



Secretary of State

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

137

Korean Vol. 2  
Memos 7/64 -  
8/65

64/7/29

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July 29, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

VIA MR. VALENTI

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLI 92-168

By SW, NARA, Date 6-23-93

254  
Korean

A five-minute pep talk to our new ambassador to Korea (a top man) would be well worth the time. He should hear personally from you that (1) you are dead serious about wanting an early ROK/Jap settlement so that Japs can help carry the aid load for South Korea (still running over \$300 million a year); (2) you favor in principle withdrawal of some U.S. forces, once doing so wouldn't look like retreat in face of Red China.

We expect to propose you send an oral message through Brown urging President Pak to press ahead on ROK/Jap settlement.

If you don't have time to talk to him, you can have a picture with him, and I'll give him the pep talk.

McG. B.

Approved for: 5-minute talk ☒  
picture only ☐

Disapproved ☐

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5:30  
July 31

Tech Bundy  
Incl Secretariat  
7/30

✓ P. K. to  
Rev. ec

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7-31-64

~~SECRET~~

July 31, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Purpose of seeing Winthrop Brown, our new Ambassador to Korea, is so you can tell him personally why you want movement on our Korean policy, especially a Korean/Japanese settlement. Five minutes should suffice.

We've poured into South Korea more than \$6.6 billion in aid (\$3.8 billion economic, \$2.8 billion military) since World War II. Despite all our aid, this nation is still an unstable U.S. stepchild. Part of the problem is the absence of leadership after years of Japanese occupation, but part stems from bad planning and neglect by the US.

Brown is a top man (he did a great job as our man in Laos 1960-62); he'll follow through on what you tell him. Suggested talking points are:

1. You are concerned over the long and frustrating record of U.S. involvement in Korea--with so little to show for it. We simply can't keep paying with so few results (we're planning \$350-400 million in aid for FY 1965).

2. So you give top priority to the long-delayed Korea-Japan settlement. Let's get Japan to start sharing the burden. Aside from \$600 million in Jap aid which a settlement would bring, we want to redevelop the natural economic ties between Korea and Japan. Brown should tell Reischauer in Tokyo your views when he goes through en route.

3. You'll put your personal weight behind getting a settlement in any way necessary.

4. To start off, Rusk suggests attached oral message for Brown to deliver to President Park. We have word that Park has told his new foreign minister to give priority to a settlement, so these words will come at a good time.

5. You are personally inclined to cut our 50,000 US troops in Korea; our needs are more in Southeast Asia. Defense of Korea is vital; but can't we do it with fewer men? Such big ROK armed forces (550,000) are also a terrible drag on the economy of such a poor country. You've held off on these cuts because they might give the wrong signal to the Chicoms just now, but Brown should keep a close eye on when it might be feasible.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-168

By fw, NARA, Date 6-23-93

*R. W. Komer*  
R. W. Komer

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

January 7, 1965

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114  
SANITIZED

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: The Week that Was

SANITIZED

Authority State 6-1-78, NSC 10-2480

By WJ, NARS, Date 8-7-81

In the last several days we have engaged primarily in dealing with the Sato visit and Vietnam. In addition, we have tried to nail down some of the arrangements for the Pearson visit.

Our Week

Vietnam, Box 12  
Memos, Vol. 25  
12/26/64-1/9/65  
114

I. Sato Visit:

Thomson and Cooper met with Ambassador Reischauer for preview of Sato's expectations, Reischauer's expectations, etc. Thomson attended a lunch hosted by Secretary Ailes to work out a conciliatory response to Sato's inevitable push on the Ryukyu question. We kept in touch with Bator and State on the civil aviation problem; and we received a briefing on the Bonins from the Navy.

Significant results:

a) Reischauer regards 1965 as the Year of Decision for US-Japan relations. Sato has come to power at a time of resurgent Japanese nationalism, in the wake of the Chicom nuclear explosion, and in a year when the Chicoms may well enter the UNGA. Sato is a high-posture man, ready to lead Japan toward a long-term UK-type dependability as a US ally -- IF we meet his demands for complete candor. If we don't, he can begin to lead Japan away from the alliance.

b) The key issue on Sato's mind is Communist China (he puts it under the general heading of "defense", along with the Ryukyus and Bonins). He is willing to play along with us on China, but only if he gets from us a clear and honest statement of our long-term as well as short-term thought and planning on China. If we give him only the cliches he has heard before, he will conclude that we have no long-term views, are unrealistic, and are not to be trusted. If we are forthcoming, a dialogue may begin that could eventually bring Japanese proposals for a coordinated approach to China and Taiwan, etc.

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